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JACK VOLTAIC 2.0
Threats to Critical Infrastructure
PREPARE n PREVENT n RESPOND
Executive Summary

Increasingly connected, ready to respond
Although digital connectivity has made our infrastructure more efficient, it has made it more vulnerable
to attack. As a result, infrastructure resilience is more critical today than ever before. Cyberspace attacks
rarely affect a single target; instead their effects, anticipated and unanticipated, ripple across interconnected
infrastructure sectors. Differing abilities to recognize a cyberspace attack, limited information sharing, varying
defense capabilities, and competing authorities complicate the response. These gaps in cybersecurity leave our
Nation vulnerable to exploitation by a determined adversary.
The Jack Voltaic 2.0 Cyber Research Project is an innovative, bottom-up approach to developing critical
infrastructure resilience. Developed by the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and hosted by the City of
Houston, in partnership with AECOM and Circadence, this research assembled critical infrastructure partners to
study cybersecurity and protection gaps.
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SUMMARY
From the 24th to the 26th of July 2018, the City of Houston, in partnership with the Army Cyber Institute,
AECOM, Circadence, the State of Texas, federal agencies, and regional public and private sectors, conducted the
Jack Voltaic (JV) 2.0 Cyber Research Project. Its execution was the culmination of 13 months of planning, with
the purpose of observing and assessing the ability of interdependent, critical infrastructure sectors to respond
to combined cyber and physical attacks. The event involved 44 organizations and 200 participants from eight
different critical infrastructure sectors.
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JV 2.0 was an innovative, bottom‐up approach to critical infrastructure resilience. The project assembled critical
infrastructure partners to conduct a research experiment to identify gaps in critical infrastructure cybersecurity.
The experiment employed a cyber exercise involving players from multiple sectors (noted above). The JV 2.0
Governance and Planning Committee, comprised of representatives from across eight critical infrastructure
sectors, met to express their security priorities. Through analysis of their perceived strengths and weaknesses,
participants tailored the exercise to stress specific aspects of their incident response and disaster recovery
plans.

Senior leaders from public and private organizations observed the exercise and discussed efforts for
improving cyber resiliency. Representatives from the following organizations were present: Military – Army
Cyber Institute, United States Army North (Fifth Army), Texas National Guard; City of Houston – Mayor’s
Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security, Houston Police, Houston Information Technology Services,
Greater Houston Partnership Cyber Task Force, Houston Police; Industry – AECOM.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

JACK VOLTAIC 2.0

BACKGROUND
The Army Cyber Institute (ACI) is an outward-facing, partnership think tank of the United States Military Academy
located at West Point, New York. The ACI commissioned this study to enable the Army’s ability to leverage strategic
partnerships and to develop a proof of concept. The need to evolve defense of the Department of Defense (DoD)
Information Network entails understanding the role of the military in addressing a cyberspace attack by identifying
the gaps and redundancies within responses. JV research includes exploration of how to synchronize DoD/United
States Government and private sector capabilities in a cyberspace attack response.
The ACI is recognized in academia for its strategic-level thinking and served predominately as an advisor and
facilitator for the JV 2.0 exercise. The idea for JV originated from a workshop conducted by the ACI in April 2016
known as the Cyber Mutual Assistance Workshop (CMAW).1
Jack Voltaic 1.0 – New York City: JV 1.0, the predecessor exercise to JV 2.0, was an ACI-led experiment
conducted in August 2016 in the form of a cyber exercise developed alongside industry partner Citigroup
to examine interdependencies among critical infrastructure. The ACI accomplished this by assessing the
performance of the federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private industry, in the event of a
“Cyber Worst Day” scenario.

U.S. ARMY INTEREST
To achieve its cyberspace vision, the U.S. Army must synchronize research efforts with a myriad of partners
and focus them on challenges of mutual concern. The ACI enables the Army to collaborate in creative ways
with industry and academic leaders and institutions, cybersecurity research centers, and policy groups. These
partnerships critically enhance Army cyberspace operations.
• Enable U.S. Army Readiness – JV 2.0 enabled readiness across the U.S. Army and the Nation by researching
the interdependencies among the Army and the DoD, industry, and local and state governments. The ACI
developed and coordinated partnerships with industry, the City of Houston, and other regional partners, who
joined advisors and participants from the U.S. Army Cyber Command, U.S. Army North, the Army Reserve,
and the National Guard. Key partners from the private sector included AECOM and Circadence.
• Reserve and Guard Integration – JV 2.0 explored the employment of the Reserve and National Guard to
defend the Nation by leveraging military cyber capabilities in its domestic response to cyberspace attacks.
Integration of these capabilities allowed participants to gain a better understanding of how policies and legal
authorities affect military responses to a cyberspace attack and develop policy recommendations. Potential
gaps in skills, training, and equipment were identified to develop best practices. This framework explored
how partnerships that leverage the insights and innovations of the public and private sectors can enhance
Army cyberspace operations.

PURPOSE
JV 2.0 was an innovative plan to enhance U.S. military superiority by leveraging municipal and corporate
partners to better understand unified land operations in megacities. The outcome of JV 2.0’s research provided
awareness and filled gaps regarding the impacts of a severe cyber event or persistent cyberspace attack against
the critical infrastructure that supports major U.S. metropolitan areas.

SCOPE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
JV 2.0 was an exercise event that demonstrated a physical attack and a cyberspace attack originating in Harris
County, Texas, which impacted multiple critical infrastructure sectors in and around Harris County and the City
of Houston, Texas. Research objectives included the following:
• Develop a framework to exercise a city’s ability to respond to a multisector physical attack and cyberspace
attack and to assess the ability of an urban Defense Industrial Base to respond to this type of attack.
• Showcase the City of Houston as an emerging national leader in cyber incident response.
• Evaluate and examine the U.S. military’s cyber protection capabilities.

Cyber Mutual Assistance Workshop Technical Report, Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute, February 2018, CMU‐SEI‐2018‐SR‐007.
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DESIGN CONCEPT
For the exercise design, JV 2.0 involved planners from each organization who provided input into the
development of a realistic, threat-based scenario which focused on local concerns. Both a live-fire exercise (LFX)
and a tabletop exercise (TTX) provided an opportunity to explore cyber‐related legal and policy issues while
necessitating participation from both senior business and local government leadership. Military participation
contributed to better understanding of the role of Reserve and Active components in tiered responses to major
cyberspace attacks. The inclusion of essential federal partners such as the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) was critically important to the exercise’s success.

Notes: The exercise consisted of three components:
Component 1: The Governance and Planning Committee was comprised of representatives from sector-specific, critical infrastructure organizations.
Committee members, also known as “trusted agents,” were key to successful development and execution.
Component 2: TTX was a simulated and facilitated discussion based on a scenario that took participants through the process of dealing with a physical
disaster blended with cyberspace attack events.
Component 3: LFX was an exercise that was comprised of an on-range, simulated virtual environment. The LFX scenario correlated with the TTX scenario.
The LFX was used to test cyber equipment and response capabilities in real time.

The design integrated concepts from several existing cyber exercise frameworks. In general, there are three
levels of players involved in an exercise. JV 2.0 focused on operational and mid-level players.
• Category 3: Senior Executives – senior leaders (e.g., senior executive and general officer players)
• Category 2: Mid-level Management – first-line supervisors (e.g., TTX players)
• Category 1: Operational – analysts and operators (e.g., virtual range/LFX players)
Cyber exercises are hindered by being too technical or too high-level, where managers, operators, and technical
personnel are physically separated. JV 2.0 was designed to incorporate elements of both the LFX and the
TTX, mimicking a real-world response in which mid-level managers would respond to threats detected by
operators and disseminate threat intelligence received from peer organizations to operators. This approach
ensured collective cybersecurity training and enhanced cross-sector information sharing practices, including
coordinated, technical-level threat intelligence sharing.

TIMELINE
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Lieutenant General (Ret.) Rhett Hernandez, United States Military Academy Cyber Chair, provides opening
remarks at the JV 2.0 Legal Policy TTX in Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• Finding #1: Growing physical and cyber risk to cities requires a different framework for risk mitigation due
to current frameworks being inadequate to meet the changing and growing threat to urban communities.
For the Nation to defend itself, U.S. cities need an adaptable and scalable model to improve the cybersecurity
posture. A bottom-up approach is required to integrate a risk management framework that is replicable and
adaptive to the rapidly evolving threat to urban communities.
• Cyberspace attacks can quickly overwhelm unprepared governments, in light of their limited resources.
According to a 2016 cybersecurity survey2, only 33 percent of local governments had a formal, written cyber
incident response plan. In February and March 2018, ransomware attacks seriously impacted online services
in Atlanta; 911 dispatch services in Baltimore; and government networks in Davidson County, North Carolina.
This demonstrated the need for increased preparedness.
»» Recommendation: The JV approach can serve as a learning system and development effort. Undertake
a series of JV exercises and hold educational workshops and conferences in key cities and localities to
identify vulnerabilities, develop solutions, propose actions, and share best practices.
»» Recommendation: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DHS, DoD, and the Department
of Energy (DOE) should work together to develop a campaign to integrate the JV risk incident response
model into an exercise framework at the national level (i.e., collaboratively among DHS, DoD, and DOE).
Ensure that military reserve component forces are incorporated as part of this effort.
»» Recommendation: Develop technology offerings that enable the scaling of the JV 2.0 LFX component,
in support of the National Defense Authorization Act Section 1649 - Pilot Program on Modeling and
Simulation in Support of Military Homeland Defense Operations in Connection with Cyber Attacks on
Critical Infrastructure.
»» Recommendation: States, cities, and localities should seek research and development support from the
Executive Branch and Congress to develop appropriate systemic approaches to cybersecurity.
»» Recommendation: Municipal and local cybersecurity efforts should better integrate the private sector,
particularly critical infrastructure (e.g., electric grid, telecoms, water, and transportation). Public-private
partnerships should evolve (i.e., move beyond service-level agreements) to induce a cultural change in the
building of trusted relationships and working together.
https://icma.org/documents/cybersecurity-survey-snapshot
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• Finding #2: The U.S. military and its allies are dependent on civil and commercial infrastructure. U.S.
infrastructure requires greater protection due to its vulnerability to sophisticated physical and cyberspace
attacks.
• While military installations have their own internal critical infrastructure providers, they still rely on service
delivery from outside of the installations’ boundaries. For example, electrical service is delivered through
commercial providers to the installation, where it is distributed by the internal utility company. In the event
that the commercial provider cannot supply electricity, an installation can only run on backup power for a
finite period, and generally does so at a diminished capacity.3
»» Recommendation: Improve Transportation and Maritime Sector Cybersecurity4 by collaborating with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and related Combatant Commands
to develop an operational risk management framework that better enables the protection of critical force
protection elements. Ensure collaboration and planning include the Reserve, the National Guard, DHS, and
DOE.
»» Recommendation: Work with allies to develop similar integrated protection frameworks in transload areas
abroad and with frontline states. As a starting place, develop these efforts within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) through the development of support networks.
• Finding #3: National Guard units are providing physical security to support cities and developing cyber
capabilities. State military departments are currently working to evolve cyber response processes (including
partnership strategies) and capabilities more rapidly.
• For example, the Major General Tim Lowenberg National Guard Cyber Defenders Act has been proposed to
create National Guard Civil Support Teams that serve at the discretion of state governors.5 If passed, the act
may provide a mechanism and funding to assist local authorities in establishing these teams and thereby
bridge federal and non-federal response efforts during cyber incidents.
»» Recommendation: As cyber response procedural handbooks are developed, they should be shared across
state military departments. Train the National Guard on procedures and assess the effectiveness of U.S.
Northern Command, U.S. Cyber Command, and FEMA exercise programs.
»» Recommendation: The DoD should maintain an inventory of existing and emerging, critical, National Guard
and Reserve, cyber capabilities, which could be leveraged by state military departments, thereby enabling
better coordination between DoD and DHS. These capabilities should be tracked as they are developed.
• Finding #4: States play a critical role in supporting municipal responses to physical and cyber events. States
must develop campaign plans for more scalable incident responses and rapid information sharing. Several
states are in the process of establishing fusion centers and Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations
(ISAOs).
• As an example, the State of Connecticut issued the Connecticut Cybersecurity Strategy in 2017 and the
Cybersecurity Action Plan in 2018. The plan includes sections for state government, municipal governments,
business, higher education, and law enforcement to address the following goals: cyber literacy, preparation,
response, recovery, communications, and verification. In addition, other states (e.g., California, Maryland,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Washington) have also emerged as leaders within the
cybersecurity realm, setting examples for other states to follow.6
»» Recommendation: Develop, fund, and implement state‐wide incident response campaigns that leverage
the JV 2.0 model. Working with other state agencies and community leaders, state emergency response
coordinators should lead this effort and serve as the central resource for cities and localities in requesting
assistance from state and federal governments.
»» Recommendation: DHS and associated, sector-specific agencies should ensure that DHS maintains
accountability of these new assets e.g., ISAOs, as they develop to evolve information sharing and ensure
state and local homeland protection. Moreover, the DoD should have the ability to leverage this capability
to evolve campaign plans to defend the Nation.
»» Recommendation: Leverage best practices and lessons learned from the financial sector’s Financial
Systemic Analysis & Resilience Center (FSARC) to implement a similar model at the local and state levels.
Over time, integrate municipalities into the Intelligence Community process.
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/11/29/pentagon-weighs-new-requirements-to-secure-militarys-vulnerable-power-grid
The National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, September 2018, pg. 9.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3712/all-info?r=60
6
https://sentinelips.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Pell-Center-State-of-the-States-Report.pdf
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• Finding #5: Policy and legal authorities at the federal and state levels do not sufficiently empower cities to
respond to cyber incidents. Policies and authorities need to be reviewed and adjusted to better help cities
defend against sophisticated physical and cyber threats. Currently, the exploration of cyber mutual assistance
is only practiced within the energy sector.
• In the course of the legal and policy TTX, key issues and shortfalls in current Defense Support to Civil
Authorities surfaced. Additionally, the panel found that policies were inadequate (e.g., cyber mutual
assistance through National Guard and industry sectors across state lines). Additional progress is needed for
continuously assessing comprehensive physical and cyber risk to cities and military installations.
»» Recommendation: Joint military organizations (e.g., National Guard Bureau) should explore possibilities
in cyber mutual assistance practice. This would involve developing policy and associated implementation
guidance that would enable more proactive and sustained national military support to cities and localities
defending against physical and cyberspace attacks.
»» Recommendation: Support appropriate policy and implementation guidance development for local
communities and state and national organizations. Annually develop and update the national intelligence
assessment of the cyber capabilities of nation-state and terrorist adversaries who exploit predictable
natural and threat-based, human-generated events. The newly-created DHS National Risk Management
Center and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) should also be engaged.
• Finding #6: The private sector is affected by sophisticated, adversarial, cyber threats. The private sector can
inform, develop, and provide solutions that benefit the public sector.
• The private sector is frequently targeted by adversaries looking to profit from breaches. These attacks can
result in a significant loss of business intelligence and intellectual property; therefore, establishment of a
public-private partnership and increased regulation is essential. In addition, profit is not our adversaries’ only
motive, as evidenced by the misinformation campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the
Sony Pictures cyberspace attack. The private sector has incentives to cooperate with public and other private
sector companies in the name of increased security.7
»» Recommendation: Key private sector representatives across multiple infrastructure sectors should
gather (often) in a single group to learn about and receive the same answers and thereby understand the
appropriate context.
»» Recommendation: Further explore the idea to create private sector “certified defenders” who have
significant cybersecurity capabilities and who would work under government authorization to help prepare
for and respond to adversarial cyber threats.

ACADEMIC FINDINGS
• Although the JV series has helped make significant strides in critical infrastructure and public‐private
partnership research, future research should focus on remaining gaps, such as coordinating among
jurisdictions, entities, and governments.
• To improve upon the success of the JV series, the project should develop a cyber education program. This
program should incorporate cybersecurity lessons learned and be shared with the wider community. The
impact of this educational program on exercise performance should be measured.
• To better understand incident identification, communication, and response, as well as improve strategic
cyber decision‐making, integration must be strengthened between information technology and operational
technology (IT/OT) personnel and senior leadership must be included as participants in future research.
• Data collection (obtained from cyber-ranges) procedures and metrics need further exploration. As primarily
qualitative research, observers and evaluators should collect the majority of data throughout the JV series,
with a focus on collecting consistent, nonattributable data to inform a replicable framework for future critical
infrastructure research. Additionally, exploration of an increased role of quantitative data collection may
provide further insights.
• Research efforts should be dedicated to better understanding today’s workforce skillsets for identifying gaps.
An example: the energy, water, chemical, and Defense Industrial Base sectors all rely on Industrial Control
Systems which are becoming more connected to the Internet. As these systems continue to modernize,
this will introduce vulnerabilities through the radio frequency spectrum. The United States will continue to
remain challenged to train a workforce in these blended environments. Training must become more available
and affordable. With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), the required skillsets (i.e., the blending of
cybersecurity with IT/OT and radio frequency) related to these technologies have yet to be identified.
https://www.mindpointgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Impact-of-Cyber-Attacks-on-the-Private-Sector.pdf
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WAY AHEAD
• Educate others and scale research and exercise activity with follow-on JV work.
• Partner with the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) for follow-on public
awareness activities.
• Work with stakeholders to address findings and operationalize recommendations.
• Develop and publish academic reports concerning cyber threats and responses.

ACRONYMS
ACI

Army Cyber Institute

AFCEA

Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association

CMAW

Cyber Mutual Assistance Workshop

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DoD

Department of Defense

DOE

Department of Energy

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FSARC

Financial Systemic Analysis & Resilience Center

IoT

Internet of Things

ISAO

Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations

IT

Information Technology

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JV

Jack Voltaic

LFX

Live-Fire Exercise

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OT

Operational Technology

TTX

Tabletop Exercise

